Mercer Law Review
Volume 73
Number 4 Eleventh Circuit Survey

Article 6

5-2022

Bankruptcy
John T. Laney III
Victoria Barbino Grantham

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Laney, John T. III and Grantham, Victoria Barbino (2022) "Bankruptcy," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 73: No. 4,
Article 6.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol73/iss4/6

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Bankruptcy
The Honorable John T. Laney, III*
Victoria Barbino Grantham**
Following the pandemic-related drop in bankruptcy filings during
2020,1 bankruptcy filings for both individuals and corporations
continued to decline in 2021.2 Experts disagree about the cause of the
decrease of filings during a period many believed would see a windfall.3
Some cite government stimulus programs for both individuals,4 and
corporations,5 others low-lending rates which allowed companies to

*United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Middle District of Georgia. Mercer University
(A.B., 1964); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 1966). Member,
Mercer Law Review (1964–1966); Co-Editor in Chief (1965–1966). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
**Career Law Clerk to The Honorable John T. Laney, III. University of Richmond (B.A.,
2015); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2020). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
1. For a discussion on opinions from 2020 that impacted bankruptcy law, see the
Honorable John T. Laney, III & Victoria Barbino Grantham, Bankruptcy, 2020 Eleventh
Circuit Survey, 72 MERCER L. REV. 1029 (2021).
2. Andrew Keshner, Bankruptcy Filings Fell in 2021, But Post-COVID ‘shadow debt’
May Spell Trouble, MARKETWATCH, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/bankruptcyfilings-fell-in-2021-but-will-post-covid-shadow-debt-spell-trouble-for-americans11623781507 (last updated Jun. 19, 2021).
3. Hon. Charles Clevert, Jr., et al., Bankruptcy Matters: The New Pandemic Wave is
ADR
INSIGHTS
(Dec.
14,
2021),
Coming,
JAMS
https://www.jamsadr.com/blog/2021/bankruptcy-matters-the-new-pandemic-wave-iscoming.
4. Andrew Keshner, ‘2022 Could Be the Year of Financial Reckoning’: Bankruptcies
Fell Dramatically in 2021, But These Challenges Await, MARKETWATCH,
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/2022-could-be-the-year-of-financial-reckoningbankruptcy-cases-fell-dramatically-in-2021-but-new-challenges-await-11641296556 (last
updated Jan. 8, 2022).
5. Alex Wolf, Corporate Bankruptcy Wave Turns to Dust, Defying Expectations,
LAW
(Jan.
5,
2022),
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberglawnews/bankruptcylaw/X4N7TF5G000000?bna_news_filter=bankruptcy-law#jcite.
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access capital more freely,6 and some believe court closures and
backlogs have discouraged parties from formal judicial restructuring.7
No matter the cause, all experts expect filings to increase in 2022.8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued
several notable published bankruptcy opinions this year.9 Along with a
brief analysis of the most consequential opinions in the bankruptcy
realm, this Article will include a brief legislative update about the
COVID-19 Bankruptcy Relief Extension Act of 2021.10
I. NOTABLE CASES
A. In re Hazan: The Doctrine of Equitable Mootness
The equitable mootness doctrine is unique to bankruptcy
proceedings. At its core, it is the decision by the court that unraveling
an estate after a confirmed plan is implausible.11 Courts decide whether
it would be inequitable to the parties in the bankruptcy case to allow an
appeal of the confirmation of a bankruptcy plan or to “moot” the appeal
for the sake of the disposition of the estate and its creditors.12 Typically,
courts invoke the doctrine in rare circumstances where an appeal of a
final order goes to the heart of the confirmed plan and would displace
the agreed upon reorganization or asset distribution.13
The doctrine is not without its critics.14 While all circuits have
adopted the doctrine in some respect, some courts have attempted to

6. Lauren Coleman-Lochner, Wait, What Happened to All Those Corporate
BUSINESSWEEK
(Jan.
6,
2022),
Bankruptcies?,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-01-06/why-bankruptcies-filed-in-2021dropped-and-why-2022-could-be-different.
7. Clevert, Jr., supra note 3.
8. Id.
9. Reynolds v. Behrman Capital IV, L.P., 988 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2021); Cutuli v.
Elie (In re Cutuli), 13 F.4th 1342 (11th Cir. 2021). These cases are bankruptcy opinions
published by the Eleventh Circuit this year; however, they are not covered in this Survey.
10. Pub. L. No. 117–5, § 1, 135 Stat. 249 (2021).
11. RICHARD LEVIN & HENRY J. SOMMER, 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.09 (16th
ed. 2021).
12. LEVIN & SOMMER, supra note 11.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Daniel Gill, Courts Overuse ‘Equitable Mootness’ to Avoid Bankruptcy
LAW,
(Aug.
5,
2021),
Appeals,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberglawnews/bankruptcylaw/X3J4K2S4000000?bna_news_filter=bankruptcy-law#jcite; Robert Miller, Equitable
Mootness: Ignorance is Bliss and Unconstitutional, 107 KY. L.J. 269 (2018).
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limit the doctrine to the most complex reorganizations.15 Yet, the
Supreme Court of the United States has never issued a decision
discussing the doctrine of equitable mootness or its bounds. On October
12, 2021, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to review a United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit case decided under the doctrine
of equitable mootness.16
On September 1, 2021, the Eleventh Circuit published In re Hazan,17
an opinion discussing its standard of equitable mootness.18 The case
began when Ms. Hazan purchased a property financed by NLG, LLC
(NLG) and defaulted on her purchase money promissory note. Judge
Robert N. Scola of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida in MiamiDade County entered a judgment for NLG for roughly $1.6 million plus
interest. In 2011, NLG sued to foreclose on the mortgage in the same
court but was denied as NLG had already pursued and succeeded in
receiving monetary damages for the breach. NLG appealed.19
During the litigation concerning Ms. Hazan’s mortgage, 9197-5904
Quebec, Inc. (Quebec) obtained an unrelated $5 million judgment
against NLG.20 Selective Advisors Group (Selective) acquired Quebec’s
judgment against NLG, and NLG’s rights and claims against Hazan
were assigned to Selective to satisfy the judgment.21
NLG won the appeal concerning Ms. Hazan’s mortgage.22 On
remand, the court entered a foreclosure judgment in favor of NLG for
over $4.8 million and set the property for sale. One day before the
foreclosure, Ms. Hazan filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. NLG filed a
proof of claim for the foreclosure judgment of $4.8 million. Selective
filed an adversary proceeding which Ms. Hazan joined. Selective and
Ms. Hazan requested the court determine the rights of Selective, Ms.
Hazan, and NLG, claiming NLG had no claim against Ms. Hazan or the
property because Selective was assigned all of NLG’s rights and claims.
At the time, Ms. Hazan had exercised her right of redemption to redeem
the property. The bankruptcy court found NLG had no remaining rights
in the property or claims against the estate, and NLG should be
15. LEVIN & SOMMER, supra note 11, at ¶ 1129.09 (citing One2One Commc’ns, LLC v.
Quad/Graphics, Inc., 805 F.3d 428 (3d Cir. 2015); Tribune Media Co. v. Aurelius Cap.
Mgmt., L.P., 799 F.3d 272, 288–89 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1459 (2016)).
16. In re Nuverra Env’t Sols., 834 F. App’x 729 (3d Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct.
337 (2021).
17. 10 F.4th 1244 (11th Cir. 2021).
18. Id. at 1247.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1247–48.
22. Id. at 1248.

1118

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

credited $4.8 million towards the satisfaction of the Quebec judgment.
NLG appealed.23
The bankruptcy court held a confirmation hearing on Ms. Hazan’s
plan on May 30, 2018, with all other creditors with objections satisfied,
withdrawn, or settled.24 NLG advised the court it had an appeal
pending with the district court but confirmed there was no stay in place
pending appeal.25 The bankruptcy court warned NLG that if the plan
was confirmed and substantially consummated, it could “moot out the
appeal.”26 NLG raised no objection to confirmation and did not seek a
stay. The bankruptcy court entered its order approving Ms. Hazan’s
plan on June 11, 2018, and Ms. Hazan began making payments. On
August 8, 2018, NLG moved for stay pending appeal, which was denied.
NLG appealed to the district court claiming the bankruptcy court
violated the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and requested a stay pending
appeal. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court, and NLG
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.27
The Eleventh Circuit first addressed NLG’s contention that the
bankruptcy court violated the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in the
adversary proceeding determining NLG’s rights.28 The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine prevents parties that have lost in state court from a de facto
appellate review by claiming the state judgment violates the losing
party’s federal rights.29 The court quickly disposed of NLG’s argument,
highlighting that Selective was not a party in the state court
proceedings and the adversary proceeding did not aim to overturn the
state court judgments, but to determine the rights of the parties at that
time in light of the state court judgments.30
The Eleventh Circuit then addressed whether NLG’s appeal was
properly dismissed for equitable mootness.31 NLG claimed that
equitable mootness only applies in large corporate bankruptcies, and
not individual bankruptcies, and added that no transactions would have
to be rescinded if the bankruptcy court’s judgment was reversed.32

23. Id. at 1248–49.
24. Id. at 1249.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1249–50.
28. Id. at 1250.
29. Id. (citing D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fid.
Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923)).
30. Id. at 1250–51.
31. Id. at 1251.
32. Id.
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The court first reiterated its standard of equitable mootness, stating
the “doctrine provides that reviewing courts will, under certain
circumstances, reject bankruptcy appeals if rulings have gone into effect
and would be extremely burdensome, especially to non-parties, to
undo.”33 The court added that bankruptcy plans are products of
negotiations between parties and to allow an appeal of the plan would
assign different rights than those for which the parties negotiated.34
The court then enumerated some factors courts should consider when
dismissing an appeal for equitable mootness including “whether the
appellant has obtained a stay pending appeal, whether the plan has
been substantially consummated, and whether third parties’ rights or
the debtor’s ability to successfully reorganize would be adversely
affected by granting the relief sought by the appellant.”35 The court
added “whether a stay is in place and whether the plan has been
substantially consummated are especially important.”36 The court then
addressed whether the dismissal of NLG’s appeal was appropriate
considering these factors.37
The court looked first as to whether a stay was in place pending
appeal.38 The court noted that NLG not only failed to move for a stay
pending appeal, but NLG’s counsel confirmed there was no stay and the
bankruptcy court warned NLG that having no stay could moot its
appeal.39 NLG asked for a stay for the first time two months after the
plan had been confirmed and moved again for a stay after the appeal
was filed.40 The Eleventh Circuit ruled that NLG’s delays were
“unreasonable.”41
The court then looked to whether the plan had been “substantially
consummated.”42 Substantial consummation is defined in 11 U.S.C.
§ 1101(2)43 as the:
(A) [T]ransfer of all or substantially all of the property proposed by
the plan to be transferred;

33.
2018)).
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 1252 (citing Bennett v. Jefferson Cnty., 899 F.3d 1240, 1247 (11th Cir.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1253.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 1101(2) (1978).
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(B) assumption by the debtor or by the successor to the debtor under
the plan of the business or of the management of all or substantially
all of the property dealt with by the plan; and
(C) commencement of distribution under the plan.44

While NLG claimed that “no property was transferred[,]” the court
reiterated the district court’s findings that prepetition property of the
estate revested in Ms. Hazan and she assumed management and
distribution of the property.45 The Eleventh Circuit stated these facts
demonstrated Ms. Hazan’s plan had been substantially consummated.46
The court finally considered the adverse effect to third parties and
the debtor’s fresh start if the appeal was granted.47 The court disfavored
how the plan would have to be reorganized and how reorganization
could affect the plan’s funding and the equity cushion for at least one
creditor, but ultimately emphasized that the appeal could “deprive” the
parties that had consented to the plan and supported its confirmation,
“the bargain to which they consented.”48 After addressing these three
factors, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of NLG’s appeal
under the doctrine of equitable mootness.49
Importantly, this case highlights the Eleventh Circuit’s test for
equitable mootness. Unlike some of its sister circuits that focus on the
complexity of the transaction,50 it seems the Eleventh Circuit primarily
examines whether the party appealing had the opportunity to prevent
the consequences of substantial consummation. As the Supreme Court
continues to stay silent on the doctrine, it is important for practitioners
in this Circuit to be aware of the court’s considerations in these cases.
B. Suvicmon and In re Le Centre: The Standards for Post-Discharge
Nominal Suits
In Suvicmon Development, Inc. v. Morrison,51 the Eleventh Circuit
found the discharge injunction for a Chapter 7 debtor prevented
judgment creditors from bringing a related fraudulent transfer claim

44. Id.
45. In re Hazan, 10 F.4th at 1253.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1253–54.
48. Id. at 1254.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., One2One Commc’ns, LLC, 805 F.3d at 436; In re Sneed Shipbuilding,
Inc., 916 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir. 2019).
51. 991 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2021).
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against the debtor post-discharge.52 In 2006, three creditors sued the
debtor, Mr. Morrison, in Alabama state court for common law fraud and
violations under the Alabama Securities Act, later adding a claim for
fraudulent transfer under the Alabama Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act. The creditors stated Mr. Morrison was transferring assets to his
sons to siphon assets away from his creditors.53
Mr. Morrison filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy in August 2018.54 The
creditors successfully moved to lift the automatic stay to proceed with
their state court case, but the court stayed the execution of any
judgment; the judgment creditors also initiated an adversary
proceeding against Mr. Morrison claiming their state court claims were
non-dischargeable. In December 2019, the bankruptcy court entered
Mr. Morrison’s discharge order while the adversary proceeding was
pending.55
In Alabama state court, a jury found in favor of the creditors under
the Alabama Securities Act and common law fraud and awarded them
just under $1.2 million, but the creditors were unsuccessful in their
fraudulent transfer claims.56 The bankruptcy court granted summary
judgment to the creditors, finding the judgment obtained under the
Alabama Securities Act was exempted from discharge under section
523(a) (19).57 The creditors also filed a motion to proceed with an appeal
and prosecution of the fraudulent transfer claims, claiming the
discharge order did not prevent the creditors from pursuing their
claims. The bankruptcy court ruled against the creditors, stating the
discharge injunction barred the creditors’ appeal. The district court
affirmed. The creditors appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.58
The plaintiffs made two arguments to the Eleventh Circuit (1) the
fraudulent transfer suit was not subject to the discharge injunction, and
(2) the creditors could proceed normally against Mr. Morrison.59 The
Eleventh Circuit rejected both arguments and affirmed the bankruptcy
court.60
First, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the plaintiff’s argument that
the fraudulent transfer suit was not subject to the discharge

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 1218.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19) (2019).
Suvicmon, 991 F.3d at 1218–19.
Id. at 1219.
Id.
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injunction.61 The plaintiffs claimed, because Mr. Morrison transferred
the assets to his sons to avoid their collection from the nondischargeable securities claim, the fraudulent transfer claim was
merely a collection action for the non-dischargeable action and the
discharge injunction did not apply.62 The court held that a fraudulent
transfer is a distinct cause of action and not merely a collection action.63
A collection action, the court stated, does not require “any allegation of
wrongdoing,” but is merely an execution on the property of a debtor.64 A
fraudulent transfer claim requires proof of wrongdoing and the court
chooses the appropriate remedy which could then require its own
execution action.65 The court held that while the fraudulent transfers
may have occurred as a result of the securities-fraud case, “the
fraudulent transfer claim gives rise to a debt that is distinct from
the . . . securities-fraud judgment[], and a finding that the underlying
debt is non-dischargeable does not mean that the debt arising from the
fraudulent transfer is non-dischargeable.”66
The court then addressed whether the creditors could proceed
nominally against Mr. Morrison to recover from his sons.67 The court
revisited its ruling in In re Jet Florida Systems, Inc.,68 to interpret its
requirements of when an aggrieved party can proceed nominally
against a debtor after discharge.69 The court held that In re Jet Florida
imposes two requirements: first, the suit cannot legally proceed without
a debtor to recover from the third party and second, the debtor will not
be economically burdened defending the suit.70 The court also
determined the standard of review of cases decided under In re Jet
Florida is whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in not
allowing the suit to proceed with the debtor as a party.71
The court ultimately held the bankruptcy court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the creditors’ motion.72 First, the court held the

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 1219–20.
Id. at 1220.
Id.
Id. at 1221.
Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1221.
Id. at 1222.
883 F.2d 970 (11th Cir. 1989).
Suvicmon, 991 F.3d at 1222–23.
Id. at 1223.
Id. at 1225.
Id.
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creditors could recover from the sons without Mr. Morrison as a party.73
The court held, under Alabama law, a grantor is not a necessary party
in a fraudulent transfer action, and even if Mr. Morrison would be a
convenient party for purposes of discovery, that does not make him a
legally necessary party.74 The court also held the suit would
economically burden Mr. Morrison because he would have to pay for his
own defense of the action.75 Therefore, the creditors did not meet the
requirements under In re Jet Florida and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the district court’s decision.76
In the second case, In re Le Centre on Fourth, LLC,77 the Eleventh
Circuit held an aggrieved party could not proceed nominally against
third parties after confirmation of a plan that released those third
parties from liability.78 Mr. Jackson was a guest at a hotel on Le Centre
on Fourth’s property when the hotel’s valet driver struck and injured
him. Mr. Jackson and his wife (the Jacksons) sued the valet driver and
his company in Kentucky state court and added Le Centre on Fourth,
LLC (Le Centre), Al J. Schneider Company Inc. (AJS), a parent of Le
Centre, and Le Centre on Fourth Master Tenant, LLC (Master Tenant),
the lessee of the property. Before Le Centre was added to Mr. Jacksons’
complaint, it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court
lifted the stay as to the Jacksons on the premise that the plaintiffs
would pursue only Le Centre’s liability insurance related to the
property on which Mr. Jackson was injured.79
While the Jacksons’ lawsuit continued in Kentucky state court, Le
Centre added the Jacksons to their list of creditors and filed its First
Amended Disclosure Statement.80 The Jacksons received the First
Amended Disclosure Statement which included a notice to read the
disclosure statement and Plan in their entirety before voting on the
Plan’s acceptance.81 Within the disclosure statement was a provision
that any person that voted for the Plan or abstained from voting “fully,
completely, unconditionally, irrevocably, and forever release[d] the
Released Parties.”82 Released Parties also received a discharge

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 1226.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1227.
17 F.4th 1326 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1328–30.
Id. at 1330.
Id. at 1330–31.
Id. at 1331.
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injunction.83 The term “Released Parties” was not a defined term in the
Plan.84 The Plan also added a release to “individuals and entities which
are affiliates of the current members and managers of the Debtor.”85
The Plan was set for confirmation.86 Le Centre filed a Second
Amended Disclosure Statement and a Second Amended Plan which
included the same language about third parties. The hearing date for
the Plan along with Le Centre’s amended filings were sent to the
attorneys for the Jacksons.87
On the day of the confirmation hearing, Le Centre filed a Third
Amended Plan that made a small adjustment to one clause in its Plan
unrelated to the Jacksons.88 The court confirmed the Plan, noting the
releases were integral to plan confirmation and Le Centre’s
reorganization. The Jacksons neither appeared at the hearing nor
objected to confirmation at any point.89
Once Le Centre’s Plan was confirmed, Le Centre, AJS, and Master
Tenant sought dismissal of Jackson’s claims in Kentucky state court,
arguing the Plan and discharge injunction barred the suit from
continuing.90 The Jacksons argued they were suing the entities in a
nominal capacity to reach their insurance; however, upon learning that
AJS did not carry liability insurance at the time, Jackson moved to
bring direct suit against AJS. The Jacksons also argued the notice they
received did not comply with Rule 2002 and thus was insufficient. The
bankruptcy court denied the Jacksons’ motion and ruled that the
Jacksons could not proceed nominally against the Released Parties
because it would interfere with the implementation of the Plan. The
Jacksons appealed, and the district court affirmed. The Jacksons
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.91
First, the court addressed the Jacksons’ Rule 2002 argument.92
Where a plan “provides for an injunction against conduct not otherwise
enjoined under the Code,” Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2002
requires additional notice to parties.93 That notice must include “in

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1332.
Id. at 1332–33.
Id. at 1334.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002 (c)(3) (2020).
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conspicuous language” that the plan includes an additional injunction, a
brief description of the injunction, and the entities subject to the
injunction.94 The court held that, while the Jacksons did not receive
notice in the form contemplated by Rule 2002, the Jacksons did have
actual notice of the bankruptcy plan’s provisions.95 The court then
looked to United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa,96 a Supreme
Court case that held actual notice satisfies the procedural notice
required by the Bankruptcy Rules regarding adversary proceedings.97
The Eleventh Circuit stated that since the Jacksons received all the
information required by Rule 2002, even if not in the form contemplated
by Rule 2002, they had actual notice of the injunction.98 Therefore, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the Jacksons’ argument was unpersuasive.99
The court then addressed the Jacksons’ contention that, even if the
injunction was valid, the Jacksons could still continue with their
nominal claims against AJS and Master Tenant.100 The Eleventh
Circuit upheld the bankruptcy court’s exercise of its power under
section 105(a) to release the third parties from liability to aid the
debtor’s reorganization.101
The court also upheld the bankruptcy court’s decision to deny
modifying the injunction under section 524(e).102 The court said that the
same reasoning for the prohibition against denying injunction
modifications for discharged debtors should apply to third parties
released by a debtor’s plan.103 Reiterating its reasoning in Suvicmon,
the Eleventh Circuit stated the Jacksons’ nominal claims must meet
two requirements to continue against a post-discharge released
party-first, that the released party is legally indispensable for the party
to recover, and second, the debtor would not be economically burdened
by the maintenance of the suit.104 The court ruled that, under Kentucky
law, Master Tenant was a legally indispensable party; however, the
court held, because Le Centre had agreed to indemnify Master Tenant
for premise liability actions, attorneys’ fees, and litigation costs, Le

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
In re Le Centre, 17 F.4th at 1335.
559 U.S. 260 (2010).
Id. at 272.
In re Le Centre, 17 F.4th at 1336.
Id.
Id. at 1337.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1337–38.
Id. at 1338.
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Centre could be economically burdened by the suit.105 Therefore, the
court held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by
preventing the nominal claims from proceeding.106
Third-party liability releases have drawn attention nationally,
including in the bankruptcy cases of the Purdue Pharma,107 Boys Scouts
of America,108 and USA Gymnastics.109 Eleventh Circuit practitioners
should be aware of the Eleventh Circuit’s standard for allowing thirdparty discharges and their scope to understand their effect when plans
containing them are confirmed. Furthermore, none of those parties
objected to discharge before litigating the effect of a discharge
injunction.110 Counsel’s careful review of all plans and pleadings before
confirmation and understanding the scope of the discharge can better
position clients pre-discharge rather than having to litigate the effect of
post-discharge injunctions.
C. In re Harris: Collateral Estoppel of State Court Claims in Federal
Court
In the case of In re Harris,111 the Eleventh Circuit concluded the
elements found in a Florida state court fraud judgment were not
sufficiently similar to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)112 for purposes of
collateral estoppel.113 In 2008, Kevin Harris promised James Jayo a
15% annual return if he invested in his two companies. Mr. Jayo
invested more than $600,000 over five years and allowed Mr. Harris to
purchase over $300,000 of inventory on his credit card.114

105. Id. at 1338–39.
106. Id. at 1339.
107. Brian Mann, The DOJ Moves to Block the Purdue Pharma Bankruptcy Deal That
Shields
the
Sacklers,
NPR
(Sep.
16,
2021),
https://www.npr.org/2021/09/16/1037806819/opioids-purdue-pharma-sackler-settlementbankruptcy-deal.
108. Soma Biswas, Boy Scouts Fall Short of Desired Vote on $2.7 Billion Abuse
Settlement, WSJ (Jan. 5, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/boy-scouts-fall-short-ofdesired-vote-on-2-7-billion-abuse-settlement-11641364299.
109. Samantha Horton, Indiana Joins Others in Objecting to USA Gymnastics
Settlement Plan, WFYI (Dec. 6, 2021), https://www.wfyi.org/news/articles/indiana-joinsothers-in-objecting-to-usa-gymnastics-settlement-plan.
110. Suvicmon, 991 F.3d at 1218–19; In re Le Centre, 17 F.4th at 1332.
111. 3 F.4th 1339 (11th Cir. 2021).
112. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2019).
113. In re Harris, 3 F.4th at 1342.
114. Id.
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By 2015, Mr. Jayo had only recovered $60,000.115 Mr. Jayo sued Mr.
Harris in Florida state court under several theories of tortious conduct,
including fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation,
investment fraud under Florida’s fraudulent investment statute, and
conspiracy to defraud. Mr. Harris answered the complaint, but because
the Florida state court found Mr. Harris lied to the court about a heart
attack when requesting additional time to respond, the court struck his
answer and entered a $1.8 million default judgment against him. The
order of default and default judgment did not specify which theories
supported Mr. Jayo’s recovery.116
Mr. Harris filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy and Mr. Jayo filed an
adversary proceeding claiming that the debt from the state court
default judgment was non-dischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A).117
The bankruptcy court found that the debt was non-dischargeable
because, by entering the default judgment, the state court found all Mr.
Jayo’s allegations to be true. Mr. Harris appealed, and the district court
affirmed, holding the default judgment established fraud and the debt
was non-dischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A).118 Both the
bankruptcy court and the district court relied on In re Bush,119 where
the Eleventh Circuit held a default judgment as a sanction entered in
the bankruptcy court was fully litigated and therefore had a preclusive
effect.120 In that case, the court reiterated that typically default
judgments do not have a preclusive effect but did except default
judgments entered as a sanction for parties that had participated in the
litigation from that general rule.121
The Eleventh Circuit held that the bankruptcy court and district
court “misplaced” their reliance in In re Bush.122 While the issues were
seemingly identical, the Eleventh Circuit noted the default judgment in
In re Bush was entered in federal court, and this case was a state law
case.123 Therefore, Florida preclusion law, not federal preclusion law,
applied.124
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Florida collateral estoppel requires “the parties and issues be
identical, and that the particular matter be fully litigated and
determined in a contest which results in a final decision of a court of
competent jurisdiction.”125 The court noted that some Florida cases add
a “critical and necessary” element but determined that the court need
not address the additional element unless the other two elements are
met.126
The court held collateral estoppel did not apply because “each of the
claims that could have satisfied the requirements of § 523(a)(2)(A)
contained alternative factual allegations that did not do so.”127 Because
the state court did not specify on what grounds the default judgment
afforded Mr. Jayo relief, the court stated it must satisfy all potential
grounds of relief on which the default judgment could have been
based.128
Section 523(a)(2)(A) requires “(1) that Mr. Harris used false
pretenses, or made a false representation, or committed actual fraud;
(2) that he relied on Mr. Harris’ conduct; (3) that his reliance was
justified; and (4) that Mr. Harris’ conduct caused [the] loss.”129 The
court added that false pretense and false representation under section
523(a)(2)(A) require that Mr. Harris’ conduct must have been
intentionally and knowingly fraudulent.130
The court held the fraudulent representation claim did not satisfy
section 523(a)(2)(A) because Mr. Jayo alleged that Mr. Harris “knew or
should have known the representations were false.”131 Under Florida
law, an individual can be found liable for fraudulent representation if
he ought to have known the representation was false, in contrast with
section 523(a)(2)(A), which requires actual knowledge.132 Therefore, the
state court could have granted the default judgment on the grounds
that Mr. Harris ought to have known the representation was false
which would be sufficient for Florida state law liability, but insufficient
for section 523(a)(2)(A) liability. Because the court could have granted
the default motion on either of Mr. Jayo’s theories of liability, the
scienter requirements were not identical and collateral estoppel did not

125. Id. at 1345 (quoting Dadeland Depot, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.,
945 So. 2d 1216, 1235 (Fla. 2006)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1347–48.
128. Id. at 1348–49.
129. Id. at 1344.
130. Id. at 1345.
131. Id. at 1349.
132. Id.
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apply.133 The court held Mr. Jayo’s state court claims for negligent
misrepresentation, investment fraud, and conspiracy to defraud were
similarly dissimilar to the requirements of section 523(a)(2)(A) and
collateral estoppel did not apply.134
In addressing default judgments, the court set the standard in In re
Harris that, if a default judgment does not include the underlying
theory of recovery, all theories of recovery in the underlying suit must
be identical to the non-dischargeability action for the court to accept a
collateral estoppel argument. Because state court judgments are often
the impetus for entities declaring bankruptcy, an awareness of this
standard is crucial for practitioners.
D. In re Gaime: A Cautionary Tale of a Backfiring Legal Strategy
The Eleventh Circuit in In re Gaime,135 held that the bankruptcy
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to lift the stay for State
Farm to intervene in a wrongful death action. 136 The facts of the case
are horrific: Kristina Gaime killed one of her sons and tried to kill
herself and her other son by running her car in a closed garage. At the
time, she had automobile and homeowner’s insurance with State Farm.
Gaime was sued by her sons’ father, her deceased son’s estate, and her
surviving son, collectively the Rotells, for wrongful death and bodily
injury. State Farm provided Gaime an attorney, but simultaneously
filed a declaratory judgment action contending that State Farm had no
duty to defend or indemnify Gaime because her policies did not cover
her actions.137
While the declaratory judgment action was pending, the Rotells
offered to settle with Gaime.138 Gaime allegedly wished to accept the
settlement because she would avoid future liability, but the State Farmemployed lawyer rejected it. After rejecting the offer, State Farm
received a declaratory judgment in their favor that they had no duty to
defend or indemnify Gaime and State Farm withdrew from the case.
Gaime failed to respond to the Rotells’ amended complaint in the
wrongful death action and the court entered a default judgment. A jury
awarded the Rotells close to $505 million.139
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Knowing Gaime was insolvent, the Rotells filed an involuntary
Chapter 7 case to recover from Gaime.140 Gaime did not contest the
case, and her estate was subjected to the control of the trustee. Gaime
had no other liabilities other than the verdict and no assets other than
a bad faith and malpractice claim against State Farm for rejecting the
settlement while its declaratory judgment was pending.141
The Chapter 7 trustee sued State Farm for bad faith for rejecting the
settlement, so State Farm moved to intervene and moved to vacate the
judgment against Gaime.142 To intervene, however, State Farm had to
obtain relief from the automatic stay because the stay does not allow
“the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial, administrative, or
other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have
been commenced before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case.”143
The bankruptcy court denied State Farm’s motion for relief from the
stay, and the district court affirmed. State Farm appealed to the
Eleventh Circuit.144
On appeal, State Farm argued that section 362(a) did not apply to its
motion to intervene, and that, if it did, it violates the Due Process
Clause, and the bankruptcy court procedurally erred in denying the
lifting of the stay.145 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed.146 First, the court
addressed State Farm’s argument that section 362(a) did not apply to
its motion to intervene.147 The court held that intervening would
continue the action and the action was already commenced before the
bankruptcy petition.148 Therefore, it fell squarely under section
362(a).149
Then the court addressed State Farm’s argument that denying State
Farm’s motion to intervene deprives it of due process because it has the
right to challenge the wrongful death action against Gaime.150 State
Farm argued that it must be allowed to intervene because there was no
other forum in which it could contest the wrongful death judgment.151
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Specifically, State Farm contended that it should be able to continue in
the forum of the bankruptcy court because a Florida state court ruled
that State Farm lacked “standing” to challenge the default judgment
against Gaime.152 The court reiterated that due process is merely the
opportunity to be heard and noted State Farm had two chances to be
heard when it voluntarily withdrew from the wrongful death action and
when it litigated the bad-faith lawsuit in state court.153
Finally, the court held the bankruptcy court erred procedurally when
it placed the burden on State Farm to show cause of lifting the stay
rather than on the trustee to demonstrate why it should not be lifted.154
However, the court held the error was harmless because the trustee
also demonstrated that there was “no cause” to lift the stay.155 The
Eleventh Circuit upheld the bankruptcy court’s view that State Farm
wanted to intervene to relitigate the judgment and the burdens
outweighed the benefits of doing so.156
This case illustrates the importance of considering the ethical
ramifications of client representation when determining a litigation
strategy. Cautionary tales of parties not ensuring that a client’s best
interest is at the forefront of a litigation strategy should signal to
practitioners the importance of ethical representation in the legal
profession.
II. LEGISLATIVE UPDATE: THE COVID-19 BANKRUPTCY RELIEF
EXTENSION ACT OF 2021
While public policy often affects insolvency, the only directly relevant
news from 2021 was the enaction of the “COVID-19 Bankruptcy Relief
Extension Act of 2021” (COVID Relief Extension Act).157 The
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (the CARES Act),158
passed in early 2020, included provisions which increased the debt limit
for Subchapter V, Chapter 11 cases, excluded some aid payments from a
debtor’s disposable income, and allowed modifications to Chapter 13
plans if a debtor was experiencing hardship related to COVID-19.159
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The COVID Relief Extension Act extended the aid payment exclusions
and debt limit provisions to March 27, 2022.160 The CARES Act only
allowed COVID-19 hardship modifications for Chapter 13 plans
confirmed before March 27, 2020, but the COVID Relief Extension Act
conferred that right to Chapter 13 plans confirmed after that date as
well.161
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160. 135 Stat. at 249.
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